The narrative that attributes PAS’s current strength solely to its alliance with Bersatu must be assessed more carefully and with greater historical discipline.
A simplistic interpretation that links PAS’s successes and failures solely to the presence or absence of coalition partners not only ignores the actual chronology but also risks distorting the understanding of PAS’s position and the future of Perikatan Nasional (PN).
Political history should not be used as a tool to intimidate coalition partners, especially when facts are arranged loosely and detached from their proper context.
Misreading the Timeline: The Barisan Alternatif Episode
The claim that PAS suffered a heavy defeat in the 2004 General Election because it lost coalition partners following the announcement of the PAS Islamic State Document is inaccurate from a chronological standpoint.
In reality, DAP left the Barisan Alternatif (BA) in 2001, whereas the PAS Islamic State Document was only announced on 12 November 2003.
When DAP withdrew from BA, PAS was still led by the late Ustaz Fadzil Noor.
Linking the breakup of BA to a document that emerged two years later is a fundamental error that should not serve as the basis for political analysis.
If there is one consistent lesson in PAS’s history, it is the party’s steadfastness to its principles.
Yet it is precisely this steadfastness that is often misinterpreted, including in contemporary political debates.
PAS Did Not Contest Alone in 2004
Another major misconception is the portrayal of PAS as having contested the 2004 General Election solo due to the absence of coalition partners.
In reality, BA did not completely collapse in 2001.
What occurred was the withdrawal of a single party, DAP, on 22 September 2001.
PAS continued its political cooperation with the Parti Keadilan Nasional (PKN) and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM).
These two parties later merged to form Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) on 3 August 2003.
This political cooperation persisted through the 2004 General Election and subsequently became the foundation for the opposition’s breakthrough in the 2008 General Election.
Therefore, portraying PAS as contesting without any political alliance in 2004 is not only misleading but also contrary to historical records.
The Real Factors Behind the 2004 Defeat
If PAS’s defeat in the 2004 General Election is to be analysed fairly, the primary factor was not the absence of coalition partners, but a major shift in the national leadership landscape.
Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad stepped down as Prime Minister on 31 October 2003 and was succeeded by Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.
The transition from PM4, who faced widespread public rejection, to PM5, who projected a more moderate clean image and promised reform, generated a new wave of hope, particularly among Malay voters.
The Malay revolt that had boosted PAS and the opposition in 1999 quickly subsided when Barisan Nasional presented a new face.
This psychological shift among voters made the 2004 electoral battleground fundamentally different.
Additionally, BN’s advantages arising from electoral boundary redelineation at the time also contributed to PAS’s defeat.
This is the more balanced reality that should be accepted if history is to serve as guidance rather than as an instrument of manipulation.
A Weak Analogy with PAS Today
Equating PAS’s current position with its situation ahead of the 2004 General Election is a weak analogy.
PAS’s major victory in the 15th General Election (PRU15) should not be narrowly interpreted as merely “riding on” PN led by Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin.
PN indeed provides the coalition framework, but PAS is not a passenger without its own engine.
PAS’s success is driven by the strength of its party machinery, organisational discipline, vibrant grassroots network and voters’ confidence in the party’s consistency of struggle.
Ignoring PAS’s internal strengths will only produce a flawed and unrealistic political reading.
The Perlis Issue: A Coalition Governance Problem
The political situation in Perlis should also not be oversimplified as a matter of loyalty to the Palace or individual actions of “upholding royal commands.”
The core issue is more structural and technical in nature: weaknesses in crisis governance within the PN coalition.
The crisis was neither brought to nor resolved through the proper mechanisms of the PN Supreme Council.
Meanwhile, the actions of five Bersatu assemblymen who submitted statutory declarations to remove the Menteri Besar without notification or party approval were allowed to proceed without clear disciplinary action.
This is not an issue of loyalty, but one of discipline, procedure and unity in coalition decision-making.
When official mechanisms fail to function, the resulting weaknesses are borne collectively by all PN components, including PAS.
PAS Accepts Coalitions, but Demands Reform
The perception that PAS intends to stand alone without any coalition is also inaccurate.
To date, there has been no official statement from PAS leadership indicating an intention to leave PN.
PAS does not reject the concept of coalition politics.
What is being questioned is the effectiveness of PN as a collective entity when internal turmoil within one component begins to undermine the stability and credibility of the coalition as a whole.
PAS’s criticism should be understood as a call for reform, not a threat of division.
Similarly, the principle that positions should not be given to those who seek them refers to individuals who pursue office for personal gain.
PAS’s demand regarding the PN Chairmanship, however, is institutional in nature, aimed at strengthening the coalition’s leadership structure, not fulfilling individual ambition.
Equating these two matters reflects either conceptual confusion or an attempt to obscure the real issue.
PRU16: Opportunities Remain If PN Functions Effectively
Finally, the prerequisites for PN’s victory in the 16th General Election (PRU16) are not as vague as some portray.
Using the outcomes of a few by-elections as definitive indicators is also inaccurate, as by-elections are heavily influenced by local factors, candidates, and micro-level dynamics.
What matters more is the broader trend.
Recent developments showing public rejection of BN and PH indicate that political space remains open.
However, this opportunity can only be capitalised upon if PN presents itself as more organised, more disciplined, and capable of convincing the public that it is not a fragile coalition weakened by internal shortcomings.
Conclusion: History Must Be Read Correctly
It is inaccurate to compare PAS today with its defeat in the 2004 General Election.
PAS lost in 2004 due to a change in national leadership that created renewed hope for BN, not because of the absence of coalition partners.
What is needed now is not to intimidate PAS with a misread version of history, but to ensure that PN is built as a coalition that functions better, is more disciplined, and inspires greater public confidence.
History is a guide.
But a guide is only useful when it is read correctly.
If history is misread, then the steps taken towards the future will also be misguided.